Floating the Australian Dollar by Wheelwright, Ted
The f lo a t in g  o f  the  
Australian dollar by the 
L a b o r g o ve rn m e n t in  
December 1983 was totally 
out o f keeping with Labor 
ideology of attempting to 
contro l the economy in the 
in te res ts  o t A ustra lian  
workers. In this article, 
which has been widely 
distributed among union­
ists, Ted W heelw right 
exp la ins the consequ­
ences o f this action.
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F L O A T I N G  T H E
A U S T R A L I A N
D O L L A R
It is no t overstating the daring nature 
of the decision to say that Keating has 
placed his po litica l future in th r  hands 
o f the intermediaries and the traders 
who operate in the cut-throat world of 
the international financial markets.
It was an action which was completely 
at odds w ith  L ab o r's  p la tfo rm  
commitment to government contro l of 
the economy, and Labor’s long and 
deeply held suspicions o f the market 
place and its belief that market farces 
do not share resources equitably.
Geoff Kitney, National Times, 16.12.83.
T he floating of the Australian dollar is probably the most fundamental single cnange in 
the management of the Australian 
economy in Deace time by any federal 
government, certainly since the Great 
Depression of the 1930s. It is totaily out 
of keeping with Labor ideology of 
attempting to control the economy in 
the interests of the working people of 
Australia, and makes the Australian 
government even more of a hostage to 
international finance capital than it 
was before, as the above quotations 
indicate.
It makes nonsense of industry Dolicy 
and attempts to increase exports — 
what happens in these areas w ill be 
more by accident than design. It makes 
a mockery of EPAC, whose advice can 
be negated overnight by the gyrations 
of the exchange rate, ana it threatens 
the accord, as pressure will mount to 
remove full wage indexation so 
that real wages will fall it devaluation 
causes higher import costs. These 
points are expanded in subsequent 
paragraphs.
The gravest danger comes from the 
increasing volatility in the value of tne 
Australian dollar which is bound to 
result, unless the Reserve Bank uses us 
powers of intervention by buying or 
selling Australian currency in the
foreign exchange market much more 
often, and to h gieater extent than the 
present arrangements envisage. This 
is what is called a 'd irty float', in 
contrast to a 'clean float' — which 
means no government intervention. 
Very few countries have 'clean floats'. 
This point will be taken up in a later 
paragraph.
T here is something to be said for a llow irg  market forces, suitably modified to affect the exchange 
rate significantly as a result of flows of 
money resulting from exports, imports 
and genuine investment, during times 
of political and economic stability, 
depending on the ability of the 
Australian economy to respond to 
price changes of imports and exoorts, 
and how the world economy responds. 
Bui we qo not live at such a time; the 
world economy is unstable, the 
recovery is fragile and very patchy, the 
world political situation is more 
serious than It has been for decades, 
tension is high, and the danger of war 
considerable.
In such a situation, international 
capital flows are extremely volatile and 
sutyect to political events, in the world 
at large, ano in our region. Recent 
years have seen substantial flows into 
our money and securities markets by 
Japanese institutions, and into our 
stock exchanges by American and 
British investors They have also seen 
large sums flowing in from Hong Kong, 
and from Chinese minorities in 
Malaysia and Papua New Guinea. In 
addition, there have been massive 
o u tf lo w s  d u r in g  th e  W h n la m  
government, and j js t  before the 
election of the Hawke government, 
wmcn had to be reversed after its 
election by a substantial devaluation. 
On top of this there has been large- 
scale speculation fo r non-political 
reasons, and movements across the
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exchanges for reasons of company 
► borrowing to pay taxes, and to take 
advantage of interest rate differentials,
* e.g. cheaper to borrow abroad than 
here, etc. Floating the exchange rate 
leduces only the speculative element 
of all these flows, as it means that those 
who bear the  co s t are o th e r 
speculators and currency holders, not 
the Reserve Bank.
Consequently, as speculative forces 
and o pe ra tions  have increased 
dramatically over the last decade or so, 
a significant degree o f speculation w ill 
continue, and in the present world 
context of 'alarums and excursions' 
will act as a destabilising influence. As 
Keynes remarked:
Speculators may do no harm as 
bubbles on a steady stream of 
enterprise. But the position is serious 
when enterprise becomes the bubble 
on a whirlpool o f speculation. When 
the capital development of a country 
becomes a by-product of the activities 
of a casino, the job is likely to be ill- 
done. (J.M. Keynes, The General 
Theory of Employment, Interest and 
Money (Macmillan, London, 1936), p. 
1E 8 )
This means that capital flows which 
have little  to do with real economic 
forces such as exports, imports, and 
actual investment, and which occur 
through a variety of motives, often to 
do with the situation in other countries, 
will cause instability in the foreign 
exchange value of our dollar, which is 
inimical to both our export industries 
(except those where contracts are in 
other currencies such as the American 
dollar, as is often the case in minerals) 
and our manufacturing industry. Such 
industries, in these circumstances, can 
only plan ahead bv usina forward 
exchanges, which means, in ettect, 
that they need to insure themselves 
against unfavourable changes in the 
value of our dollar, at considerable
Australian Left Review 87
cost which is used to amploy even 
more financial parasites than exist in 
our already overblown finance sector
Not only that, but large, wild swings 
in the foreign exchange value of the 
Australian dollar, sustained for a 
longish period of time, may destroy 
entire industries, hor example, if there 
was a stampede of capital from Hung 
Kong in the next few years — which is 
not unlikely — much of it would come 
to Australia, and would force up the 
value of our dollar on the free market 
for some considerable time. The effect 
would be to reduce the income of many 
e x p o rte rs , in o u r m oney, and 
encourage a flood of cheap imports 
which would compete away much of 
what is left or our manufacturing 
industry. If sustained, such price 
changes could irrevocably destroy 
some industries in both the export 
sector, and the import competing 
sector. An upward revaluation o f the 
currency is equivalent to a rax on 
exports ano a subsidy on imports.
C onverse ly , a su bs ta n tia l and 
sustained outflow of money from 
Australia would cause a devaluation 
of our dollar. Th's is more likely in the 
longer run as the economic forces 
operating on Australia are such as to 
increase our indebtedness, reduce our 
export income in relation to /mport 
costs, increase our payments for 
shipping insuranceand debt servicing, 
causing us to anproximate to a Third 
World country in these respects. (See 
Australia: A Client SNfe by Greg 
C ro ug h  and Ted W h e e lw rig h t, 
Penguin, Melbourne. 1982, Chapters, 
"O ut of Control — Trade, Payments
and Debts''.) Such a continuinq 
depreciation of our dollar, if sustained, 
wouio benefit export industries and 
import competing industries in the 
short run, as it is tantamount to a 
subsidy on exports and a tax on 
imports Its effects would depend on 
whether, as a result, exports were 
increased, and imports reduced; but as 
many imports are essential it would 
send up the costs of all industries 
dependent on imports, and this would 
work its way through to the export 
industries. The consumer price index 
would be affected, the cost of living of 
working people would be increased, 
and if the accord were implemented, 
there would be fu ll indexation. 
However, there would be tremendous 
pressure — which is beginning to 
develop nnw — to break this link 
protecting the workers standard of 
living, and abolish indexation as 
incompatible with market forces.
The above illustrates the importance 
of the exchange rate as a tool of 
econom ic  p o licy ; g iven Labor's  
philosophy it should be set at a level 
which maximises fu ll employment in 
e x p o r t  and im p o r t  c o m p e tin g  
industries, minimises inflation, and 
prevents too much of an increase in 
foreign indebtedness, and hence 
reduction in independence. This is 
d ifficu lt enough to achieve even with 
co m p e te n tly  en fo rced  exchange 
controls (as distinct from incredibly lax 
ones of recent years, for whicn either 
the Reserve Bank or its political 
masters, or both, must be held 
responsible), but it is impossible with a 
'clean float'. The exchange rate is then 
sel at a level which maximises the 
interests of international capital, in its 
various forms ana conditions, around 
the world  — if these coincide with the 
interests of the working people of 
Australia, this is by accident and not oy 
design.
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The Hawke government must do 
nothing to upset the high priests of 
international finance.
T he political component of all this is very important, as spelled out in the opening quotations 
referring to the political future of 
Keating (and by implication of the 
labor Party/ being placec 'in the hands 
of the intermediaries and the traders 
who operate in the cut-throat world of 
the international financial markets". It 
means that the Hawke government 
must do nothing politically to upset the 
high priests of international finance 
lest they take their money out of the 
country: this has a bearing on such 
matters as admitting foreign banks, 
foreign investment policy, giving 
unions a greater say in economic 
policy formulation, consumer and 
environmental protection — virtually 
anything which could reduce the 
profitab ility of capital and reduce its 
m a n a g e r ia l p re ro g a t iv e s  and  
privileges.
It also means that the ability of the 
Hawke government to reduce interest 
rates will be circumscribed, asno ton ly  
does finance capital profit from higher 
real interest rates and therefore have 
predilection for them, but also it w ill be 
necessary to  keep ours higher than 
elsewhere to attract foreign money and 
prevent it leaving. Even with the 
recently laxly enforced exchange 
controls, it was difficult, for this 
reason, to achieve lower real rates of 
in te re s t. N ow  it may w e ll o 
impossible, we could be locked into a 
high real interest rate syndrome. This 
is particularly likely, given the very 
small nature of oureconomy, trade and.
money flows in relation to tnose of the 
'big league', in world economic affairs
— the Americans. Japanese and 
Europeans. We are attempting to plav 
first grade league football with the 
size, resources, and expertise o f the 
third division.
Talk of Sydney or Melbourne 
becoming a financial centre of
30
Paul  Keat i ng,  and the Labor  
government ,  In the hands ot  
Interm ediaries and traders who 
operate In the cut-throat world ot 
international financial markets.
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S.E.Asia and the Pacific, perhaps 
replacing Hong Kong, is fanciful, to put 
it mildlv In the first place, to compete 
with them, Australia would need to 
adopt their economic and social 
conditions, which involve much lower 
taxes on co rp o ra te  p ro fits , no 
particular taxes on the finance 
industry, no unemployment pay and 
no wage indexation, with trade unions 
which are creatures of the state. In the 
second place, they are both small 
enclave' economies which have been 
used to generations of free trade, and 
on which financial activities have a 
minimal repercussion. In the third 
place they are hardly democratic 
models of p o litie s  w hich  m ost 
Australians would wish to follow in 
pursuit of economic gain,
While there would be some gain in 
employment because of the expansion 
of the finance sector, these would be 
minimal, due to the very capital 
intensive technology used in this type 
of ’wholesale banking', There would 
not be much extra employment for the 
traditional bank-clerk type of activity; 
most of it would be taken up by the 
high powered money changers who 
would inhabit a few more Temples of 
Mammon which would spring up in the 
city centres of Sydney and Melbourne. 
However, even if there were a net gain 
in employment there, it would be more 
than offset by the unemployment 
caused elsewhere in the economy by 
the requirements of the financial 
sector.
One example of this is Britain, where 
London is still reputed to be the 
financial centre of the world, although 
Ihis is open to dispute, particularly by 
the Americans. London and the 'home 
counties' are relatively prosoerous, 
and th e  m id d le  c la s s e s  a re  
concentrated there, but much of the 
industrial heart of the country in the 
midlands and the north is dying on the 
vine, w ith  very h igh  levels o f 
unemployment. One maior reason 
for this is the high value of the pound 
sterling, which hampers manufactured 
exports and increases manufactured 
imports, thus em ascu la ting  the 
industry. Another reason is that the 
abolition of exchange co n tro ls  
facilitates the export of capital which 
should have been used to re-equip 
decaying manufacturing industry to 
help make it more competitive. Since 
the removal of exchange controls in 
1979, it is estimated that about £30 
billion have left the UK.
Another example ts the USA, where 
the development of New York as an 
international financial centre rivalling 
London may have created some 
employment and other benefits there, 
but these have obviously been offset
by other activities of the expanded 
financial community, such as tne 
exDort of capital from industrial areas, 
and high interest rates which attract 
large inflows of capital from abroad, 
thus keeping the US dollar at a high 
value, which inhibits exports and 
encourages imports, helping to cause 
an enormous trade deficit. In both 
cases, the UK and the USA, the issue is 
much more complicated than space 
allows, but the essential point is that 
neither of them provides evidence that 
freer foreign exchanges and entry of 
foreign banks contrioute to higher 
overall employment and a higher 
standard of living for working people.
Even in Switzerland, which is 
probably the best example of a 
successful financial centre, because 
its history and geographical location, 
money naa to be prevented from 
flowing into the country some years 
ago, because it was forcing up the 
Swiss franc to levels so high that they 
were inh ib iting the export of Swiss 
manufactured goods. Consequently, a 
negative rate ot interest was imposed 
on such tunas, i.e. foreigners had to 
pay to have their funds located in 
Switzerland.
Floating the dollar and abolishing exchange controls also makes it more d ifficu lt to detent offshore tax avoidance schemes, according to the director of taxation services with 
P riceW aterhouse. The exchange 
control regulations often provided a 
paper trail that assisted the Taxation 
Commissioner in tracing taxable 
income. In his last published report, 
Frank Costigan recommended the 
tightening up of exchangp control 
regu la tion s , and suggested  tha t 
Singapore should be added to the list 
of recognised tax havens. Obviously 
this will not happen now, so that to the 
billions of tax dollars lost to the 
Treasury in 'bottom-of-the-harbour 
schemes', we must now add untold 
billions to be lost in 'bottom -of-the- 
Pacific schemes’ , with the result that 
working people of Australia will have to 
pay even more tax, while the rich 
financiers go scot free. Is this Labor 
party policy? (Mansn Wilkinson, 
National Times, 16.12.83.)
The next step is obiously to license 
more traders in foreign exchange and 
admit foreign banks. The argument for 
is that the existing market of a few 
Australian banks is too narrow for it to 
operate properly, and hence it must be 
widened; aiso the new system w ill give 
these banks a semi-monopolistic 
advantage because they are so few. 
(The Campbell Report showed that the 
four largest banks and the four largest 
insurance companies accounted for 
about 80 percent of financial assets in
Australia.) But once the market is so 
widened there is no guarantee tnat it 
w ill stay so. the whole history of the 
m erger m ovem ent stands m ute 
witness to the contrary, and the 
evidence in the USA shows that even 
there foreign banks have been more 
aggressive, have taken business away 
from local banks, and also taken them 
over. (See Robert B. Cohen, The 
Impact of Foreign Direct Investment 
on JS  Cities and Regions, The 
A n a 'y t ic  S c ie nce s  C o rp o ra tio n , 
Virginia, 1979.)
This should not be allowed to 
happen here. No more licences to 
trade in roreign currency should be 
issued; if new foreign hanks are now 
allowed in, these licences would be 
snapped up by existing merchant 
banks, wh.ch appear to be the main 
source  o f cu rren cy  sp ecu la tion . 
Trading in foreign currency should 
remain the preserve of existing banks, 
snould be strictly supervised by the 
Reserve Bank, and excess profits from 
this activity should be suoject to tax. 
There is no presumption that more 
banks mean cheaper money, more 
access to it by those who need it, or 
more stability, certainly not in the long 
run. The evidence seems to suggest 
that more and bigger banks mean more 
debt, more instability and higher real 
interest rates. More control of financial 
institutions is required, not less. This is 
the lesson of the history of their 
evolution ever since the South Sea 
Buoble (which is upon us again, in 
a oifferent form).
Finally, a word on ’d irty floats'. This 
used to be ca lled  gove rnm ent 
intervention', orgovernment 'counter­
speculation'. This last usage was 
coined when governments were much 
stronger vis-a-vis large corporations 
than they are today. Now they cannot 
match the resources available to the 
giant global corporations, especially 
the transnational banks Any notion 
th a t g o ve rn m e n ts  can o p e ra te  
successfully in the market place 
against them is a delusion. What 
governments can and must do is fo 
control access to the market place by 
licensing and policing the operators, 
Even that is not easy, hut unless the 
Labor government attempts to control 
the activities of international finance 
capital in Australia, they will inevitably 
be controlled by it. They m ight not 
mina this, but the people they purport 
to represent w ill suffer.
Ted Wheelwright has been teaching 
Political Economy for 30 years In a 
hostile environment at Sydney 
University.
A u s t r a l i a n  Left Review 87 31
